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Abstract
Levy and Arditti (1973) introduced depreciable assets into the Modigliani and
Miller (1958) model, and analyzed the implications for the cost of capital. Assuming
that the ﬁrm reinvests indeﬁnitely to maintain a constant expected cash ﬂow, they
found that depreciation increases the cost of capital before and after tax. Most of
their assumptions are maintained. However, commitment to perpetual reinvestment
is in most cases not a reasonable assumption. Without it, depreciation decreases the
cost of capital before and after tax. The eﬀect of depreciation is less in absolute value
than in Levy and Arditti, but not insigniﬁcant.
Keywords: Cost of capital, depreciation, corporate taxes
JEL classification numbers: G31, H25
Levy and Arditti (1973) (LA73 hereafter) extended the Modigliani and Miller (1958,
1963) (MM58, MM63) analysis by introducing depreciation. In spite of the long time
which has passed, one particular assumption in the analysis deserves attention today. One
main result concerns the eﬀect of depreciation on the required expected rate of return
on investment. While both LA73 and MM assumed that the ﬁrm commits to a constant
expected cash ﬂow forever, a more realistic assumption leads to a reversal of the sign of
this eﬀect from positive to negative. The magnitude of the eﬀect can still be substantial.
There are strong indications that most companies do their project valuations with meth-
ods which are deﬁcient in one or more ways, at least as seen from a theoretical viewpoint.
Even some terms which are fairly easy to predict and/or adjust for, so that practice could
be brought more in line with theory, are often neglected. A leading textbook by Brealey
and Myers (2003) suggests that “In practical capital budgeting, a single discount rate is
usually applied to all future cash ﬂows” (p. 239). The empirical investigation by Graham
and Harvey (2001) conﬁrms this. Brealey and Myers (2003) also state that “Depreciation
tax shields contribute to project cash ﬂow, but they are not valued separately; they are just
folded into project cash ﬂows along with dozens, or hundreds, of other speciﬁc inﬂows and
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outﬂows” (p. 546). This paper, as well as LA73, shows the inadequacy of such a practice.
It is demonstrated that one feasible method is to adjust the cost of capital for depreciation
tax shields.
A company often operates, or contemplates to operate, under various tax rates and/or
various tax depreciation schedules. This could be due to operation in diﬀerent countries, or
in sectors (within a country) which are taxed diﬀerently (e.g., natural resource extraction),
or simply due to using assets with diﬀerent tax depreciation. According to the view of
LA73, maintained in this paper, the companies should not apply the same discount rates
(neither before nor after corporate taxes) in these diﬀerent situations. The same view is
relevant for analyses of tax reforms or hypothetical tax systems. Lund (2002a) describes
how some oil companies based their arguments against a tax reform on a ﬁxed discount
rate, inconsistent with theory. The topic is highly relevant today, and the purpose of this
paper is to suggest an alternative model with opposite results from those in LA73.
LA73 assumed economic depreciation which results in an investment outlay being re-
quired each period in order to maintain the perpetual revenue stream, constant in expected
terms. The depreciation is tax deductible, and for simplicity, tax depreciation equals eco-
nomic depreciation. They also assumed that both the replacement outlay and the tax
value of the deduction are known with certainty for all future periods. The result is that
depreciation increases the required expected rate of return, both before and after taxes.
Bradford (1975) suggested that the tax value of the depreciation deductions might be
risk free, but that the replacement outlays would be risky. This resulted in a completely
diﬀerent conclusion, namely that depreciation decreases the required expected rate of re-
turn.
The present paper suggests that the results in both papers are misleading. The basic
situation in which the concept of a required expected rate of return applies, is an investment
with no commitment to perpetual reinvestment. Tax depreciation deductions are still
applicable, however.
Results will be presented in the form of required expected rates of return both before
and after corporate taxes. This is in line with MM63 and LA73. While the economics
literature concentrates on the distortions, which show up in the before-tax required rates
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of return, it is also interesting to know what would be the right discount rates for companies
to use after taxes.
Like the cited sources, the present paper does not rely on a particular model of the
capital market, such as the CAPM. The results rely on value additivity only. Two related
papers, Lund (2002b) and Lund (2003), give the implications of these results in a CAPM
framework. The exact relation between this paper and Lund (2002b, 2003) is explained in
Lund (2003). Brieﬂy, the diﬀerences are as follows. Lund (2002b, 2003) are less general
since they assume a CAPM type model, and since the company’s operating cash ﬂow is
always given as price times quantity, PQ, of which Q is chosen by the company while P
has an exogenous probability distribution (under competitive conditions). On the other
hand, results are arrived at there without specifying a particular proﬁle for economic or
tax depreciation. In addition, the model in Lund (2002b, 2003) allows for a variety of
corporate and personal tax systems, and for uncertainty over future tax positions of the
companies, i.e., the tax value of future deductions being risky.
I The model with perpetual reinvestment
The model in this section follows LA73 and Bradford (1975) as closely as possible. The
model portrays a ﬁrm with the same expected cash ﬂow, element by element, in every
period after the initial investment. The ﬁrm has debt, which is not repaid, but which
requires a yearly interest payment. The expected after-tax cash ﬂow before payment of
interest, but including the resulting value of the tax deduction for interest, is
X¯ t = (1− t)C¯ − K¯∗ + tK + tR, (1)
where C is annual before-tax operating cash ﬂow, t is the corporate tax rate, K∗ is replace-
ment investment outlay, K is the (risk free) tax depreciation deduction, and R is (risk free)
interest payment. The bar over variables denotes expected values. Inﬂation is neglected
(or the tax system is inﬂation adjusted). The possible diﬀerence between K and K∗ was
introduced by Bradford (1975).
Both papers sort the cash ﬂow elements in two categories, one risk free and one risky.
The two papers diﬀer over the riskiness of the replacement outlay, with expected value K¯∗.
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The value of the levered ﬁrm according to LA73 (their equation (4)) is
V =
(1− t)C¯
ρ
− K¯
∗
r
+
tK
r
+
tR
r
(2)
(but with K∗ = K), while Bradford (1975) uses
V =
(1− t)C¯
ρ
− K¯
∗
ρ
+
tK
r
+
tR
r
, (3)
for the same value (his equation (9)). Here, ρ is the risk-adjusted discount rate applicable
to the operating cash ﬂow, while r is the market interest rate, applicable as a discount rate
for the risk free cash ﬂow elements. Both rates are assumed to be constant over time. By
value additivity we can assume that the same discount rate is applicable to C and (1− t)C,
as long as t is constant. Not only does Bradford assume that economic depreciation may
have a diﬀerent expected value than tax depreciation, but also that it has a diﬀerent risk,
namely the same risk as the operating cash ﬂow.
It should be noted that both papers assume that the ﬁrm pays taxes every period, so
that there is no risk connected to the tax payments, not even to their timing. This is
obviously a simplifying assumption, cf. footnote 5 of MM63. Even if the operating revenue
is risky, the assumption may not be too unrealistic at the margin if the ﬁrm has other
projects which are weakly (or negatively) correlated, or more proﬁtable, or both. But of
course, every year some ﬁrms are out of tax position, carry-forward reduces present values,
and some deductions are lost completely. Lund (2003) considers uncertainty about the
ﬁrm’s tax position.
What are the eﬀects of depreciation on the required expected return on investment? If
we compare with the expression without depreciation,
V =
(1− t)C¯
ρ
+
tR
r
, (4)
the consequences of the LA73 assumptions become clear. Assuming K∗ = K, they subtract
the positive amount (1−t)K/r from the value in (4), or equivalently, they subtract (1−t)K
from each year’s cash ﬂow. This is similar to an increased operating leverage, and thus
raises the risk of the net cash ﬂow as long as the risk of K is less than the net risk of the
other cash ﬂow elements.
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In general the sign of a cash ﬂow element’s contribution to the systematic risk of the
net, overall cash ﬂow of a company depends on the element’s own systematic risk and
whether it is an inﬂow or an outﬂow. When it is assumed that the risk of the elements
falls in only two categories, distinguished by r and ρ, we are left with only four cases, and
qualitative results (the signs of eﬀects) follow easily. The model of the next section gives
more detailed results, since we are also interested in the magnitude of eﬀects, cf. table 1.
These, of course, depend on relative magnitudes of the cash ﬂow elements as well.
The assumptions of Bradford (1975) lead to a less clear-cut result than those of LA73.
Comparing with (4) one ﬁnds that the eﬀect of introducing depreciable assets has an
undetermined sign. But Bradford shows that two assumptions are suﬃcient to determine
a negative sign: K¯∗ = K together with ρ > r. The latter means a positive risk premium,
or a “positive beta” in the CAPM jargon. The former reintroduces one of the LA73
assumptions, so that the objection made by Bradford boils down to the riskiness of the
replacement outlay. By continuity, since K¯∗ = K gives a negative sign, then K¯∗ close to
K also does.
We are left with two opposing views on the eﬀect of introducing depreciation in the MM
model. Levy and Arditti (1975) recognize that the alternative assumptions of Bradford lead
to the opposite conclusion. But they disagree with Bradford’s view that the replacement
investment outlays are exactly as risky as the operating cash ﬂow. Thus they end up with
an even less clear-cut conclusion, since it is clear that an intermediate discount rate leaves
the sign undetermined.
II An alternative to perpetual reinvestment
The objection to the perpetual reinvestment model is that it is unrealistic and thus mis-
leading. It is very rare that an investment decision involves a commitment to perpetual
reinvestment. As will be shown, this objection has important implications for the conclu-
sion. The standard, basic use of the concept “required expected rate of return” is for an
investment decision made once. There may be some commitment to investment outlays
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over some limited period, but the present value of these is normally included as part of the
initial investment.
Since 1975 the literature on real options has emerged (see, e.g., Brennan and Schwartz
(1985) or McDonald and Siegel (1986)), as well as the literature on the analogy between
nonlinear taxes and ﬁnancial options (e.g., Ball and Bowers (1982) or Green and Talmor
(1985)). We can distinguish between three diﬀerent types of projects: (i) A project with
commitment to (re)investment only in a limited number of periods. (ii) A project with
investment in the ﬁrst period and commitment to (re)investment in all future periods. (iii)
A project with investment in the ﬁrst period plus options to (re)invest in some or all future
periods. Type (ii) is hardly seen in practice. The third type, however, may be the most
realistic and has been the focus of recent research. Nevertheless a leading book on real
options states that, “This does not mean that static (passive) NPV should be scrapped;
rather, it should be seen as a necessary input to an options-based expanded-NPV approach
to capital budgeting,” Trigeorgis (1996, p. 152). By “NPV” Trigeorgis means net present
value with a risk-adjusted discount rate. This means that the treatment of the most basic,
ﬁrst type of projects is still of interest.
The objection to perpetual reinvestment does not imply a criticism of the original MM
model. Modigliani and Miller were consistent in ignoring depreciation and assuming a
perpetual cash ﬂow stream with a constant expected value. They also mentioned the
possible extensions, depreciation, non-perpetual cash ﬂows, and non-perpetual debt, cf.
footnotes 9 and 16 in MM63. It is the introduction of depreciable assets which raises the
question of reinvestment. For the purpose of characterizing the required expected rate of
return, it is more appropriate to leave reinvestment aside.
Dropping the commitment to perpetual reinvestment leaves a simpliﬁed model. The
term K∗ disappears from the cash ﬂow expressions and from the value expressions. For
many types of assets there will still be tax depreciation, however. But it will — for realistic
tax systems — decrease over time, since the tax depreciation is now related to the initial
investment only, not to the reinvestment. If assets depreciate, and there is no commitment
to reinvestment, the cash ﬂow is unlikely to have a constant expectation.
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In order to understand the diﬀerences between the three diﬀerent models, MM63, LA73,
and the suggested model with exponential decline and no reinvestment, consider the fol-
lowing general model which encompasses them all. The time period is denoted by τ . The
assumptions are:
1. The ﬁrm invests an amount I > 0 in period τ = 0. In each subsequent period, τ , the
amount reinvested is µ times the capital in the previous period τ − 1. Capital also
depreciates at a rate ξ, so that capital declines at a net rate (ξ − µ) ∈ [0, 1).
2. The ﬁrm borrows a fraction (1− η) ∈ [0, 1) of the gross investment in each period, so
that η is the equity share. Repayment of the debt follows depreciation, so that the
total debt is always the same fraction 1− η of total capital.
3. The ﬁrm is always in tax position, and it always pays its debt service.
4. From period τ = 1 onwards the four elements of the expected cash ﬂow — the
expected operating cash ﬂow, the reinvestment, the tax value of the depreciation
deduction, and the debt service — all decline at the same exponential rate, (ξ−µ) ∈
[0, 1).
5. In period τ = 1 the before-tax operating cash ﬂow is C, the reinvestment is µI, the
tax depreciation deduction is K = ξI, and the interest payment is R = r(1− η)I.
6. The operating cash ﬂow is the only source of risk of the cash ﬂow stream. To ﬁnd its
market value at τ = 0, its expected values, C¯(1 − ξ + µ)τ−1 > 0, can be discounted
at the constant risk-adjusted rate ρ.
7. The non-risky elements of the cash ﬂow stream can be discounted at the risk free
interest rate r, with 0 < r < ρ.
8. A corporate income tax at a constant rate t ∈ [0, 1) applies, with the tax base in-
cluding the operating cash ﬂow minus tax depreciation and minus interest payments.
The MM63 assumption is 0 = µ = ξ, LA73 is obtained with 0 < µ = ξ, while the
new model suggested in the present paper has 0 = µ < ξ. The original articles (and the
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subsequent literature) had a strong focus on the eﬀect of debt on the cost of capital. Thus
debt is included here as well, although it has no particular signiﬁcance for the results, as
long as debt ﬁnancing is less than one hundred percent. The case of the unlevered ﬁrm is
obtained by letting η = 1.
The value as of τ = 0 of the after-tax cash ﬂows of the levered ﬁrm from τ = 1 to
inﬁnity is
V =
∞∑
τ=1
[
(1− t)C¯(1− ξ + µ)τ−1
(1 + ρ)τ
+
(t(K + R)− µI)(1− ξ + µ)τ−1
(1 + r)τ
]
=
(1− t)C¯
ρ + ξ − µ +
t(K + R)− µI
r + ξ − µ , (5)
where the debt service itself is left out, while the value of the tax deduction for interest is
included. This is thus the value of the cash ﬂow to equity and debt taken together.
The criterion for accepting an (additional) investment is that
dV
dI
=
1− t
ρ + ξ − µ
dC¯
dI
+
t(ξ + r(1− η))− µ
ξ + r − µ ≥ 1, (6)
since the left-out debt and debt service (implied by the tax deduction for the interest
payment) has a net value of zero.
In line with MM63 and LA73 the criterion (6) will be expressed as requirements for (i)
the expected rate of return before tax, and for three diﬀerent expected rates of return after
tax, both (ii) the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), (iii) the expected rate of return
to debt and equity together, and (iv) that to equity only. In each of these four cases we
ﬁrst need to identify what that expected rate of return is for the kind of cash ﬂow proﬁle
under consideration, without specifying that the project should be marginal. Then we
can reformulate the requirement given by (6) in terms of a requirement for that particular
rate. The underlying requirement is the same each time, but expressed as requirements for
diﬀerent rates (based on diﬀerent cash ﬂow deﬁnitions), which could be calculated for any
given project.
The before-tax expected rate of return is that rate ρb which solves
∞∑
τ=1
(dC¯ − µdI)(1− ξ + µ)τ−1
(1 + ρb)τ
= dI. (7)
The solution is ρb = dC¯/dI − ξ, independent of µ.
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The requirement given by (6) can now be reformulated. The resulting minimum value
of ρb will be denoted ρ
∗
b . Inequality (6) is equivalent to
ρb =
dC¯
dI
− ξ ≥ (1− w)ρ
(
1 +
tη
1− t
)
+ wr
(
1 +
tη
1− t
)
≡ ρ∗b , (8)
where
w =
ξtη
1−t(1−η) − µ
r + ξ − µ . (9)
The expression 1 + tη/(1− t) is recognized from MM63, and is found in equation (10)
below. This reﬂects the basic distortion in the before-tax rate of return, caused by the
tax system. If ρ and r are equal, the expression equals the relative tax wedge, ρ∗b/ρ. The
required rate is thus a weighted average of two adjusted versions of ρ and r, respectively,
both adjusted to reﬂect the tax wedge.
The weight w is not always between zero and unity. In the model with depreciation,
but without reinvestment, with 0 = µ < ξ, we have w ∈ [0, 1), so that the required rate
of return is between ρ[1 + tη/(1− t)] and r[1 + tη/(1− t)]. But in the LA73 model, with
0 < µ = ξ, the weight is negative, so that the required rate exceeds ρ[1 + tη/(1 − t)].
This suggests (which will be even more clear below) that dropping reinvestment from the
general model turns the LA73 result around: The required expected rate of return is then
decreasing in the depreciation rate, not increasing.
The weight itself can be interpreted as the present discounted value of an exponentially
declining perpetual stream, thus the denominator r + ξ − µ. The numerator is perhaps
easiest to interpret in the case with η = 1, when the expression is simpliﬁed to ξt − µ.
The ﬁrst term is the tax value of the depreciation allowance, while the second is the outlay
for reinvestment, both as fractions of capital. The weight on the risk free component in
(8) is thus the present value of the risk free cash ﬂow stream. This can be exactly zero if
(assuming η = 1) reinvestment is equal (in absolute value) to the tax value of depreciation,
µ = ξt. If µ/ξ < t, then the weight is positive, while µ/ξ > t makes it negative.
Leverage makes this more complicated since reinvestment carries an additional tax
beneﬁt of debt. This concludes the interpretation of the before-tax required expected rates
of return.
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Setting 0 = µ = ξ gives
ρ∗b → ρ
1− t(1− η)
1− t ≡ ρ
(
1 +
tη
1− t
)
≡ A, (10)
which is the expression given in MM63, equation (7), p. 440. In case there is no debt,
the relative tax wedge A/ρ will equal 1/(1 − t). But interest deductibility implies that
the wedge is reduced towards unity as borrowing increases. Setting 0 < µ = ξ gives the
expression in LA73, their equation (10),
B ≡ ρ1− t(1− η)
1− t + ξ
ρ− r
r
. (11)
Setting 0 = µ < ξ gives the expression suggested here, for the case with no reinvestment,
ρ∗b = ρ
1− t
(
1− η r
ξ+r
)
1− t +
rξtη
(r + ξ)(1− t) . (12)
For this last model, the net eﬀfect of depreciation is given by
∂ρ∗b
∂ξ
=
trη(r − ρ)
(1− t)(ξ + r)2 . (13)
This is negative when r < ρ. Thus we have obtained an eﬀect with the opposite sign
from that in LA73, who ﬁnd that a higher rate of depreciation increases the before-tax
required expected rate of return. The main reason for the diﬀerence is the omission here
of the yearly investment outlay. In LA73 this has the same eﬀect as operating leverage.
Removing it means lower risk in the net cash ﬂow.
They illustrate the importance of their result by a table, their table 1 on p. 692, which
shows the ratio of this B to the MM63 expression, denoted A in (10) above. They use the
values t = 0.5, r = 0.05, η = 0.5 throughout. The similar ratio of ρ∗b (from (12)) to A is
shown in the right-hand half of table I. The left-hand half reproduces parts of the table in
LA73 for comparison. TABLE
I HERE.The table clearly illustrates the strong diﬀerences in results. The very high required
rates of return implied by the LA73 assumptions are replaced by rates which are below the
MM63 values, but which do not diﬀer as much. The diﬀerence is not insigniﬁcant, however.
For a realistic case of ρ = 0.12 and ξ = 0.2, the numbers are ρ∗b = 0.152 and A = 0.18.
A lower tax rate of t = 0.34, not shown in the table, gives ρ∗b = 0.136 and A = 0.151. A
higher equity share, η, would lower the ratio, i.e., increase the diﬀerence between the rates.
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Next we consider the after-tax required expected rates of return. For the sake of
readability, we skip the general model and consider only the case with no reinvestment.
We then compare the results with those of MM63 and LA73. It should be noted that they
will here be expressed as marginal rates of return, while formally, both MM63 and LA73
express them as average rates of return. They are really also requirements on marginal
rates of return, however, since the tax system is linear, and the average rates they derive,
determine projects with exactly zero net value. This follows since in MM63, eq. (11.c),
and in LA73, eq. (7), the perpetual rates of return are expressed as X¯ t/V, not as some
arbitrary X¯ t/I.
Set now µ = 0. The WACC is based on an after-tax cash ﬂow deﬁnition which excludes
the tax beneﬁt of debt. It is that rate ρw which solves
∞∑
τ=1
[
dC¯(1− t) + tdK
]
(1− ξ)τ−1
(1 + ρw)τ
= dI. (14)
The solution is ρw = (1− t)dC¯/dI − (1− t)ξ = (1− t)ρb.
The last of these equations is the reason why we present the WACC ﬁrst of the after-tax
requirements: There is a very simple relationship between ρw and ρb. This relative tax
wedge, ρb/ρw, only depends on the tax rate, as it is equal to 1/(1− t).
Since the tax advantage of debt is not included in the numerator in (14), it will instead
(for a given marginal project, i.e., given dC¯ and dK (= ξdI)) aﬀect the denominator. The
requirement given by (6) can be reformulated. The resulting minimum value of ρw will be
denoted ρ∗w. Inequality (6) is equivalent to
ρw = (1− t)dC¯
dI
+ tξ − ξ ≥ ρ(1− t) + (ξ + ρ)trη
ξ + r
≡ ρ∗w. (15)
As a control, we observe that if ξ → 0, then
ρ∗w → ρ [1− t(1− η)] (16)
which is the value given in MM63, equation (8), p. 442. Compared with their result, the
last term (containing η) is reduced when ξ > 0, since by assumption, ρ > r. From (13) and
ρw = (1− t)ρb, it is clear that ∂ρ∗w/∂ξ < 0. In this model, contrary to the model of LA73,
the after-tax cost of capital is decreasing in the depreciation rate. This is true when it is
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deﬁned as the WACC, and next we show that it also holds for other concepts of after-tax
costs of capital.
The after-tax expected rate of return to equity and debt is based on an after-tax cash
ﬂow deﬁnition which includes the tax beneﬁt of debt. It is that rate ρa which solves
∞∑
τ=1
[
dC¯(1− t) + t(dK + dR)
]
(1− ξ)τ−1
(1 + ρa)τ
= dI. (17)
The solution is ρa = (1− t)dC¯/dI + t(ξ + r(1− η))− ξ.
The requirement given by (6) can again be reformulated. The resulting minimum value
of ρa will be denoted ρ
∗
a. Inequality (6) is equivalent to
ρa = (1− t)dC¯
dI
+ t(ξ + r(1− η))− ξ ≥ ρ− (ρ− r)tξ + (1− η)r
ξ + r
≡ ρ∗a. (18)
As a control, we observe that if ξ → 0, then
ρ∗a → ρ− (ρ− r)t(1− η), (19)
which is the value given in MM63, equation (11.c), p. 439. Compared with their result,
there are two opposing new eﬀects when ξ > 0 (assuming also η < 1). First their expression
is increased by multiplying 1 − η with the fraction r/(ξ + r). But then another term is
subtracted.
It turns out that the second eﬀect is the greater in absolute value. The net result of
depreciation is given by
∂ρ∗a
∂ξ
=
trη(r − ρ)
(ξ + r)2
. (20)
This is negative when r < ρ. Thus we have obtained an eﬀect with the opposite sign from
that in LA73, who ﬁnd that a higher rate of depreciation increases the after-tax required
expected rate of return to equity and debt, their expression (7), p. 690.
Next we consider the expected rate of return to equity alone.
The after-tax expected rate of return to equity is that rate ρe which solves
∞∑
τ=1
[
dC¯(1− t) + t(dK + dR)− (ξ + r)dD
]
(1− ξ)τ−1
(1 + ρe)τ
= ηdI. (21)
The solution is ρe = [(1− t)dC¯/dI + t(ξ + r(1− η))− (ξ + r)(1− η)]/η − ξ.
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The requirement given by (6) can again be reformulated. The resulting minimum value
of ρe will be denoted ρ
∗
e. Inequality (6) is equivalent to
ρe =
(1− t)dC¯
dI
+ t(ξ + r(1− η))− (ξ + r)(1− η)
η
−ξ ≥ ρ+(ρ−r)(1−t)1− η
η
−tξ ρ− r
ξ + r
≡ ρ∗e.
(22)
As a control, we observe that if ξ → 0, then
ρ∗e → ρ + (ρ− r)(1− t)
1− η
η
, (23)
which is the value given in MM63, equation (12.c), p. 439. Compared with their result, an
extra term is subtracted when ξ > 0.
The net result of depreciation is given by
∂ρ∗e
∂ξ
=
tr(r − ρ)
(ξ + r)2
. (24)
This is negative when r < ρ. Thus we have obtained an eﬀect with the opposite sign from
that in LA73, who ﬁnd that a higher rate of depreciation increases the after-tax required
expected rate of return to equity, their expression (9), p. 690.
From (22) we also ﬁnd the familiar WACC formula,
ρ∗w = ηρ
∗
e + (1− η)r(1− t). (25)
This veriﬁes that our deﬁnitions of ρw and ρe are the conventional ones.
III Discussion
The results show that in the model presented, the eﬀect of tax depreciation is quite diﬀerent
from what LA73 suggested. The diﬀerence is due to a diﬀerent description of the decision
for which the required expected rate of return will be used. There is no objection here to
using the results in LA73 for a situation in which commitment to perpetual reinvestment
is realistic. However, mistakes will be made if the required rate suggested by them is
applied to a decision without such a commitment. Too many projects will be rejected,
since the requirement found in the present paper is lower. Their required rate should
only be applied if (i) cash ﬂows are speciﬁed with perpetual reinvestment, and (ii) the
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commitment to perpetual reinvestment is the only choice, or can somehow be shown to be
the best choice.
If one ﬁrst considers an investment project like in this paper, and ﬁnds that the expected
rate of return is satisfactory, and one then realizes that there are options to reinvest, this
can only make the project more attractive. Options to reinvest is something quite diﬀerent
from commitment to reinvest.
The results may have important implications for the use of market data in capital
budgeting. If a potential investment project has an operating cash ﬂow with the same risk
as some existing ﬁrm, it is often recommended that the market’s required rate of return
for that ﬁrm be used to ﬁnd the cost of capital applicable in the investment decision. The
procedure of unlevering the discount rate (or the beta in a CAPM setting) is well known.
This is reﬂected in the diﬀerence between ρ and ρ∗e as it appears in (22) above.
The results show that another adjustment may be necessary if the new project uses
diﬀerent kinds of assets with diﬀerent depreciation rates. This idea was implied also in
LA73, but their assumptions are not applicable for most projects.
An adjustment is also needed if the new project uses assets with the same depreciation
rate, but is subject to a diﬀerent tax rate, e.g., in a diﬀerent year, country, or sector. While
it is well known that taxes aﬀect the cost of capital in a levered ﬁrm, we show that this also
happens for an unlevered ﬁrm when assets are depreciable. These are partial equilibrium
eﬀects, assuming ρ and r are unaﬀected by a change in t. From the inequalities (12) and
(18) above, we ﬁnd:
∂ρ∗b
∂t
=
(ξ + ρ)rη
(ξ + r)(1− t)2 > 0, (26)
and
∂ρ∗a
∂t
= − [ξ + r(1− η)](ρ− r)
ξ + r
< 0. (27)
That the ﬁrst of these is positive, is not surprising. More will be said about the tax
wedge below. That the second is negative, is often ascribed to leverage. But here we
observe that even with η = 1, i.e., no leverage, the negative eﬀect remains as long as
ξ > 0. Again this can be explained as analogous to operating leverage, but this time with
a negative sign.
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The eﬀect of depreciation on the expected rate of return after corporate taxes is some-
thing quite diﬀerent from the eﬀect before corporate taxes. The requirement after corporate
taxes is taken directly from the capital markets. The reason why this requirement depends
on the tax depreciation schedule, is that the depreciation rate alters the risk characteristic
of the after-tax cash ﬂows. Adding a risk free cash ﬂow each period (namely, the tax value
of the depreciation deduction) has the opposite eﬀect of borrowing. In the CAPM jargon
it decreases the systematic risk of the cash ﬂow.
The requirement before tax, however, shows how much the tax system distorts the
investment decision as compared with a no-tax situation. This was also found to be neg-
atively aﬀected by the depreciation rate. We can now ﬁnd the eﬀect of the depreciation
rate on the absolute tax wedge, ρ∗b − ρ∗a. From (13) and (20) we get
∂(ρ∗b − ρ∗a)
∂ξ
=
t2rη(r − ρ)
1− t < 0. (28)
The absolute tax wedge is decreasing in ξ, as the before-tax requirement decreases faster
than the after-tax requirement.
Like in LA73 and Bradford (1975), the analysis so far does not show the separate eﬀect
of regulating the tax depreciation schedule. It is based on the simplifying assumption that
this is always equal to economic depreciation. While this is not always realistic, it was
done so in order to obtain simple analytical results. However, for the before-tax required
rate ρ∗b , the separate eﬀect of tax depreciation is not diﬃcult to derive if we are willing to
assume that debt is repaid at the same exponential rate as tax depreciation. This yields a
tractable solution. In Assumption 5, K = ξI should be replaced by K = νI. Assumption
4 should be replaced with:
4a From period τ = 1 onwards the two risk free cash ﬂow elements — the tax value of the
depreciation deduction, and the debt service — both decline at the same exponential
rate, ν ∈ [0, 1). This rate is thus both the rate of tax depreciation and the rate
of repayment of the (remaining) debt. The expected operating cash ﬂow, however,
declines at the rate ξ ∈ [0, 1).
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Of course, if ξ > ν, the assumption that the ﬁrm is always in position to pay debt
sevice and taxes relies even more heavily on income from other sources than the marginal
project considered here.
Instead of (5), the value of the ﬁrm is now
V =
∞∑
τ=1
[
(1− t)C¯(1− ξ)τ−1
(1 + ρ)τ
+
t(K + R)(1− ν)τ−1
(1 + r)τ
]
=
(1− t)C¯
ρ + ξ
+
t(K + R)
r + ν
. (29)
Instead of (6), the criterion for accepting an (additional) investment is now
dV
dI
=
1− t
ρ + ξ
dC¯
dI
+
t(ν + r(1− η))
ν + r
≥ 1. (30)
Instead of (12), the minimum value of ρb is now ρ
∗
b given by
ρb =
dC¯
dI
− ξ ≥ ρ1− t
(
1− η r
ν+r
)
1− t +
rξtη
(ν + r)(1− t) ≡ ρ
∗
b . (31)
We can now ﬁnd the eﬀects on ρ∗b of separate changes in ξ and ν. They are,
∂ρ∗b
∂ξ
=
trη
(1− t)(ν + r) > 0, (32)
and
∂ρ∗b
∂ν
=
−rηt(ρ + ξ)
(1− t)(ν + r)2 < 0. (33)
The signs of these could be seen fairly directly from (30). A higher ξ means that the
operating cash ﬂow decreases more rapidly. If ν is ﬁxed, the operating cash ﬂow must then
start at a higher level (relative to dI, i.e., a higher dC¯/dI) in order for the ﬁrst term to
exceed 1− t(ν + r(1− η))/(ν + r). A higher dC¯/dI means a higher ρ∗b . A higher ν, on the
other hand, means that the value of the fraction t(ν + r(1−η))/(ν + r) increases, and with
ξ ﬁxed this implies a lower ρ∗b .
As a control, we can let ξ = ν and add the two eﬀects. A small change in ξ alone, and
then an equally small change in ν, amounts to the small simultaneous change considered in
equation (13). True enough, the two partial eﬀects in (32) and (33) add up to the eﬀect in
(13), which is negative. A partial increase in ξ will increase ρ∗b , a partial increase in ν goes
in the opposite direction, and the latter eﬀect is the stronger if the two partial increases
are of equal size.
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In the concluding remarks of LA73 (p. 693), we ﬁnd, “The higher the annual depre-
ciation ﬁgure, the lower the ﬁrm’s value. At ﬁrst glance, this result seems paradoxical,
since the higher depreciation, the higher the certain tax beneﬁt tK. However, one must
recall that the greater the depreciation, the greater the replacement outlay that the ﬁrm
is committed to make in order to assure a perpetual income stream.”
Two comments should be made. The ﬁrst statement, about the ﬁrm’s value, is some-
what misleading. The whole analysis concerns a marginal investment, which has a net
value of zero. If, for instance, the tax system is changed in an unfavorable direction, a
partial eﬀect of this may be to decrease the ﬁrm’s value. But the total eﬀect in this kind of
analysis is to increase the required rate of return before taxes so much that the net value
of the marginal project is still zero.
The ﬁnal statement in the quotation illustrates the dependence of LA73 on the assump-
tion of commitment to perpetual reinvestment. This is the assumption which explains the
seemingly paradoxical result. The assumption was not challenged by Bradford (1975).
IV Conclusion
When introducing depreciable assets into the model of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963),
one must carefully consider whether to maintain their assumption of perpetual cash ﬂows
with constant expected values. For the purpose of investment decisions, the assumption
implies that the ﬁrm commits to undertake reinvestments forever. This is unrealistic in
most cases.
Without the assumption of reinvestment, the eﬀect of depreciation on the cost of capital
is reversed. This is true for the cost of capital both before and after corporate taxes. The
strong positive eﬀect found by Levy and Arditti (1973) is replaced by a weaker, but still
signiﬁcant, negative eﬀect.
The ﬁndings have implications for the use of capital market data for deriving the cost
of capital for investment decisions. Not only should observed rates of return be unlevered,
but they should be adjusted for diﬀerent depreciation rates and tax rates.
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Denominator: A, the expression from MM63
Numerator: B of LA73 ρ∗b of this paper
ξ 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
ρ
0.05 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.06 1.00 1.44 1.89 2.33 2.78 3.22 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
0.07 1.00 1.76 2.52 3.29 4.05 4.81 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.91
0.08 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.88
0.09 1.00 2.19 3.37 4.56 5.74 6.93 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.86
0.10 1.00 2.33 3.67 5.00 6.33 7.67 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84
0.11 1.00 2.45 3.91 5.36 6.82 8.27 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.83
0.12 1.00 2.56 4.11 5.67 7.22 8.78 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.81
0.13 1.00 2.64 4.28 5.92 7.56 9.21 0.84 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.80
0.14 1.00 2.71 4.43 6.14 7.86 9.57 0.83 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.80
0.15 1.00 2.78 4.56 6.33 8.11 9.89 0.82 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.79
0.20 1.00 3.00 5.00 7.00 9.00 11.00 0.80 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.76
Table I: Ratios of required expected rates of return before tax. Case with depreciable
assets divided by case without. Reinvestment (LA73) or no reinvestment (this paper). 72
diﬀerent combinations of ρ and ξ. Other parameters: t = 0.5, r = 0.05, η = 0.5.
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